In this paper, I consider a new source of vagueness: vagueness in the fundamental laws of physics. I call this phenomenon nomic vagueness. I offer a general account of nomic vagueness in terms of the existence of (apparent) borderline lawful worlds. The existence of nomic vagueness would have implications for the nature of laws and the mathematical expressibility of laws. I suggest that nomic vagueness may be a feature of our world, where the arrow of time points to a Past Hypothesis.

Chaos theory studies systems that display sensitive dependence on initial conditions-a property that makes long-term prediction of chaotic systems practically impossible. This paper is an attempt to explore some of the metaphysical implications of chaos theory. Drawing on recent work in statistical mechanics, I argue that chaos theory has dramatic consequences for how we should understand the dynamical structure of the world and our relationship to it. In particular, I show why the domain in which we can predict and explain that structure should be thought of as a limiting case in a generally chaotic universe.

Many in quantum foundations seek a principle explanation of Bell state entanglement. While reconstructions of quantum mechanics (QM) have been produced, the community does not find them compelling. Herein we offer a principle explanation for Bell state entanglement, i.e., conservation per no preferred reference frame (NPRF), such that NPRF unifies Bell state entanglement with length contraction and time dilation from special relativity (SR). What makes this a principle explanation is that it's grounded directly in phenomenology, it is an adynamical and acausal explanation that involves adynamical global constraints as opposed to dynamical laws or causal mechanisms, and it's unifying with respect to QM and SR.

In this paper, we connect two different debates in philosophy of science: the debate on the scientific legitimacy of string theory, and the debate on whether some epistemic values count as minimal criteria that need to be exhibited by any acceptable theory. Our two main claims are as follows. Firstly, we maintain that the debate on minimal criteria needs to be addressed by turning to the history of science. Secondly, we argue that the current prominence of string theory within high-energy physics suggests that empirical adequacy, understood as demonstrated agreement between theory and evidence, is not an indisputable minimal criterion. 

Quantum field theories containing massless particles such as photons and gluons are divergent not just in the ultraviolet, but also in the infrared. Infrared divergences are typically regarded as less conceptually problematic than ultraviolet divergences because there is a reasonably straightforward cancellation mechanism that renders measurable physical observables such as decay rates and cross-sections infrared finite. In this paper, I scrutinize the restriction to measurable physical observables that is required to make the cancellation mechanism applicable. I argue that this restriction does not necessitate a retreat to operationalism about the meaning of the theory as one might reasonably have worried, but it does call attention to a collection of under-appreciated conceptual issues lurking in the infrared regime of quantum field theories with massless particles.